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Abstract With the rapid advance of bio-genetic tech-
nology, it will soon be possible for parents to design
children who are born with certain genetic traits. This
raises the question whether parents should be allowed to
use this technology to engineer their children as they
please. In this context it is often thought and argued that
liberalism, which has a reputation for being permissive of
all kinds of practices, grants parents the right to do so.
However, I will argue that, on an understanding of liber-
alism that is identical to the one used by the defenders of
genetic design, liberals should wary of such practices.
Liberalism, in its most general form, requires that any time
individuals exercise power over others they justify it
without relying on any particular conception of what a
good life is. When we design children to have certain traits
that are only useful for realising some conceptions of the
good life, we are implicitly endorsing those conceptions.
Hence this practice cannot be justified in neutral terms, and
liberals should be sceptical of it. Only when we engineer
our children to have traits that are useful for all conceptions
of the good life can liberals allow the use of this new
technology. Indeed, liberalism holds that this is morally
required.
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Introduction
Liberals have a reputation for being a permissive bunch.
The general perception is that liberalism holds that, under
certain background conditions, euthanasia, gay marriage,
gambling, prostitution and recreational drugs should all be
available to competent adults who choose to avail them-
selves of them. Admittedly, there is the question
concerning what the appropriate background conditions are
for these freedoms to be justified, but the general sentiment
of liberals is thought to be that all these goods should be
available in society. Hence one might think that when
considering how society should deal with the prospect of
eugenics, i.e. the use of biotechnology to create offspring
with particular characteristics, liberals would be similarly
permissive. It is indeed the case that most theories of
eugenics that are described as liberal have in general been
tolerant of the idea. Liberals of very different tempera-
ments have declared their willingness to embrace genetic
technology (e.g. Dworkin 1986, Chapter 13; Posner 1992,
pp. 429–434). Furthermore, the most prominent advocates
of restricting the use of such technology are typically not in
the liberal camp (e.g. Kass 2003; Sandel 2007). On
eugenics, the battle line seems to have been drawn between
liberals and non-liberals.
In the literature on eugenics there are two prominent
theories that claim to represent the liberal attitude to
eugenics. A very prominent theory, described as Liberal
Eugenics holds that as long as the use of eugenic tech-
nology is non-coercive, state-neutral and individual,
parents may use the possibilities of biotechnology to design
their children as they see fit (e.g. Agar 2004; Fletcher 1974;
Harris 1992; Kitcher 1996; McGee 2000). However, Lib-
eral Eugenics is by no means uncontested as the liberal
theory of eugenics. Fox (2007) has argued that actually the
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Liberal Theory of Offspring Enhancement, or Theory of
Enhancement for short, is the liberal answer to the problem
of eugenics. This theory differs from Liberal Eugenics in
that it morally requires parents to use genetic tools to give
their children certain ‘‘natural primary goods’’, i.e. genetic
traits that are valid for all paths of life. However, it agrees
with Liberal Eugenics in allowing parents to genetically
manipulate the DNA of their offspring with regard to other
genetic traits, i.e. traits that are only useful for certain plans
of life. As such both theories are fundamentally very
willing to embrace the tools of genetic enhancement, and
permit parents great discretion in how they may use them
on their offspring.
However, liberalism can, on a proper understanding of
liberalism, hardly justify the unrestricted use of eugenics.
When considering the two ‘‘liberal’’ theories of enhance-
ment it seems obvious that the central feature of both
theories, i.e. allowing parents to design their children
according to their own understanding of the good, is pat-
ently illiberal, where I understand liberalism in much the
same way the proponents of these theories do. In my view,
allowing parents to create children of their own design is a
violation of the autonomy of the children. Liberalism
requires far-reaching restrictions on the use of eugenics.
Due to the intergenerational nature of eugenics, this is one
area where liberals must be strict. Hence I would like to
propose the Theory of Neutral Enhancement. This theory
takes on board the insight that parents have a moral
imperative to give their children natural primary goods.
However it differs from both theories in that it forbids the
use of genetic technology if parents wish to use it to give
their children goods that are useful for only certain plans of
life. This seems to me the correct liberal stance towards the
use of genetic technology for designing our offspring.
My argument will unfold as a commentary on the
exchange between Liberal Eugenics and the Theory of
Enhancement as Fox presents it. This exchange is crucial
because it uncovers the incongruity between liberalism and
Liberal Eugenics. I believe that Fox’s criticism of Liberal
Eugenics goes right to the heart of what it is to be a liberal
and what this requires in terms of eugenics. However, he
fails to unearth the entirety of the problems with Liberal
Eugenics, and consequently does not take his insight to its
full conclusion. By considering Fox’s argument, and noting
where it goes astray, it will become clear what liberalism
really requires.
Liberalism
Fox defines liberalism as a doctrine ‘‘affirming equal
respect for persons as free and independent selves, capable
of choosing their own values and ends.’’(2007, p. 7) That
seems to me to be entirely correct. This may be interpreted
as generating a commitment to both respecting and pro-
moting equally people’s capacity to choose ends for
themselves, i.e. their autonomy. These are the two central
commitments of liberalism, and they will do much of the
work in what follows. The aspect of respecting individuals’
autonomy finds central expression in liberal theory in the
requirement of neutrality. Nobody may impose their ends,
that is their idea of what a good life is, on others. To allow
this would be respecting some people’s ends more than
those of others (cf. Dworkin 1986, Chapter 11). This
explains the liberal’s insistence on rights; there are things
that may not be imposed on individuals, be it by other
individuals or the state. In particular, given the liberal
commitment to neutrality, nobody may force others into a
specific plan of life on account of it being superior. I, your
neighbour, or the state cannot impose upon you a religion,
a way of thinking or anything else, for the reason that it is
deemed correct. To do so would be showing unequal
respect for the various plans of life and for individual
members of society. Hence, neutrality requires that any-
time anyone wields power over an individual, the use of
that power must be justified through reasons that do not
invoke any theory of the good (cf. Ackerman 1980, pp. 10–
12).
Of course, liberalism is not anarchy, and does allow for
the impositions of restrictions and obligations. Although
these cannot be based on any particular theory of the good,
they may be driven by the protection and promotion of
individuals’ autonomy, which liberalism regards as a stated
goal (Fox 2007, p. 7). Indeed, ensuring that individuals will
not have any theory of the good imposed on them will often
require considerable regulation. Freedom of speech, free-
dom of movement and all the core freedoms liberals
cherish because they allow individuals to live their lives as
they please, cannot be guaranteed by a government that
refuses to defend these freedoms. Rather, the government
must actively protect individuals’ freedoms and rights. For
example, governments must ensure that those who refuse to
respect other people’s rights are persecuted.
However, merely protecting individual rights is not
enough. Individuals might have the formal freedom to live
as they please, but they might simultaneously lack the
physical, cognitive and financial resources to make effec-
tive use of that freedom. Freedom of movement means
little to the handicapped if they do not have a wheelchair.
More generally, the formal freedoms of liberalism must be
accompanied with measures designed to allow individuals
to autonomously choose and realise their conception of the
good. This realisation leads to the second central com-
mitment of liberalism, the promotion of individual
autonomy. This promotion of autonomy can be achieved in
many ways. It justifies a commitment to providing
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individuals with education, as education allows individuals
to choose their conception of the good more reflectively. It
also legitimises measures designed to help people better
realise their conception of the good, such as improving
health or providing individuals with financial resources.
Such measures are useful for all plans of life and hence
they are advantageous to possess for anyone, regardless of
their conception of the good. These measures do not violate
the liberal insistence on neutrality; they do not make any
conception of the good more attractive than others. Rather,
they give individuals the means to realise whatever con-
ception they have chosen and are in line with the liberal
ambition to protect and promote individuals’ autonomy.
(cf. Raz 1986)
Three contenders
There are three theories that claim to embody the liberal
position regarding the use of genetic technology to design
our offspring: Liberal Eugenics, the Theory of Enhance-
ment and the Theory of Neutral Enhancement. Before I
argue that both Liberal Eugenics and the Theory of
Enhancement are illiberal and that the correct liberal theory
is the Theory of Neutral Enhancement, I will briefly
present the three theories that hope to claim the prestige of
liberalism for themselves.
Eugenics has a bad reputation. It is primarily associated
with state mandated policies of the past where governments
used force to achieve certain procreative results. Reacting
to the horrors of such policies, Liberal Eugenics seeks to
propose a more acceptable framework for the use of
reproductive technology (cf. Agar 2004; Fletcher 1974;
Harris 1992; Kitcher 1996; McGee 2000). It puts control of
this technology in the hands of parents, i.e. it holds that as
long as the use of eugenics is voluntary, individualistic and
state neutral it is morally permissible. The criterion of
voluntariness requires that decisions concerning the use of
reproductive technology must be made by parents, free
from coercion. The criterion of individuality requires that
these choices be made by individual parents and for indi-
vidual children, while the criterion of state neutrality
requires that the government does not promote any con-
ception of what sort of people there ought to be. Hence
Liberal Eugenics gives parents enormous discretion to
design their children as they please; they may decide to
give their children any genetic goods that suits them, or
none at all. So if parents wish to have a child that is par-
ticularly gifted in the field of music or athletics they may
genetically intervene to achieve this result. But they might
also decide to not to use the available technology in any
way. Liberal Eugenics leaves parents firmly in control;
anything goes as long as it meets the three requirements.
Fox’s Theory of Enhancement differs from Liberal
Eugenics in that it morally requires that parents use eugenic
technology to give their children certain goods that are
useful for all plans of life (2007, pp. 13–17). These goods,
including health, basic cognitive functioning and the like,
should be given to all newborn children, and hence Liberal
Eugenics’ parental discretion is limited in this respect.
Parents do not have the right to not use reproductive
technology to give their children these so-called natural
primary goods. However, the theory agrees with Liberal
Eugenics that parents have the right to give their children
other genetic goods that are not useful for all plans of life.
So under the Theory of Enhancement, parents who would
like a musically gifted child may still use genetic tech-
nology to achieve this result. However, they may not
decide to withhold certain traits that are useful for all plans
of life from their from their future child. In this way the
Theory of Enhancement maintains the general parental
discretion of Liberal Eugenics, but subjects it to an
exception when it comes to natural primary goods, which
should be given to all children regardless of their parents’
wishes.
The Theory of Neutral Enhancement further curtails
parental discretion. It agrees with the Theory of Enhance-
ment that parents have a moral obligation to give their
children the all-purpose natural primary goods. However, it
also holds that any other genetic intervention is illiberal.
Parents do not have the right to give their children genetic
traits that are not useful for all plans of life. Hence parents
who desire children who are particularly gifted in some
domain, such a music, maths or athletics, may not use
reproductive technology to act on that desire. This tech-
nology must only be used to equip children with natural
primary goods. Indeed, this is deemed a moral requirement.
In summary, one might distinguish two types of
eugenics. The one is used to give children natural primary
goods that are useful for all plans of life, while the other is
used to give children other genetic characteristics. Liberal
Eugenics holds that parents may practice both types of
eugenics as they please. The Theory of Enhancement holds
that the former type of enhancements is morally required,
but the latter type of enhancement is still left to parental
discretion. The Theory of Neutral Enhancement agrees
with the Theory of Enhancement regarding the first type of
eugenics, but forbids the use of the second type of
eugenics.
From liberal eugenics to the theory of enhancement:
natural primary goods enhancement
Now that the three contending theories have been intro-
duced we may turn our attention to the question which
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theory is most congruent with liberalism and its require-
ments. In order to do so I will explore the two types of
eugenics along which the three theories differ, beginning
with the question of how liberalism regards the use of
eugenic technology to give children natural primary goods.
As was discussed above, Liberal Eugenics holds that par-
ents may but need not give their children these goods. It is
not distinguished from other types of eugenics, which are
also deemed permissible. This is typically justified by
noting that liberalism allows parents great discretion in
how they raise their children. Liberal societies permit
parents to steer the development of their children in
countless ways. Parents may exert considerable pressure on
their children during their upbringing. They may enrol their
children in sports programs and music lessons as well as
teaching them about their preferred religion and the like.
This parental discretion is characteristic of how liberal
societies raise their children. Liberal Eugenics sees repro-
ductive technology as nothing more than another tool with
which parents can raise their children as they see fit. In this
way, it is argued by analogy that parents should be unfet-
tered in their use of genetic technology in designing their
children. This is covered by the general discretion parents
are said to possess in raising their children.
Fox is keen to challenge this analogy. He points out that
liberals do not allow parents to do anything they please to
their children (2007, pp 5–7). Abuse, maltreatment and
neglect are not allowed, nor is the withholding of educa-
tion. Rather, liberals make inoculations, primary schooling
and the like compulsory. They do so because these mea-
sures promote individual autonomy. Liberals require
parents to give their children a good start in life, by
ensuring that they possess those characteristics that allow
them to effectively choose and pursue their conception of
the good. Hence the analogy Liberal Eugenics relies on,
between accepted parental practice and the use of eugenics
has another side to it. While liberals do permit parents
considerable discretion in how they raise their children,
they also require parents to equip their children with the
resources they need to develop into autonomous individu-
als. So Fox extends the analogy, by arguing that just as
liberals make things like elementary schooling and basic
disease prevention compulsory, they should also make
natural primary goods enhancement morally compulsory.
Natural primary goods enhancement serves exactly the
same function as these accepted practices, and is hence
morally required as well. For this reason the Theory of
Enhancement accepts the basic premise of Liberal
Eugenics, but extends it to argue that liberal principle
requires natural primary goods enhancement (Fox 2007,
pp. 8–10). This is at the heart of Fox’s case for compulsory
natural primary goods enhancement, and he is right to point
this out. I agree that the liberal commitment to enabling
individuals to effectively choose and pursue their concep-
tion of the good requires natural primary goods
enhancement. However, the same commitment to individ-
ual autonomy that generates this conclusion is also a reason
against allowing other forms of enhancement.
From enhancement to neutral enhancement:
perfectionist enhancement
If natural primary goods are genetic traits that are useful for
any plan of life, the inverse correlate might be termed
perfectionist natural goods. These are traits that are only
useful for certain plans of life, and may very well be det-
rimental to many others. They might include musical
ability and specific types of athletic prowess. All genetic
traits that are useful for some plans of life but not for others
are included in this category. Hence the distinction
between natural primary goods enhancement and perfec-
tionist enhancement is a very clear one; if we can imagine a
plan of life for which the proposed enhancement is not
useful, it is not a natural primary good. Under the Theory
of Enhancement parents are perfectly free to use the tools
of genetics to give their children these perfectionist natural
goods.1 They may do this because they deem certain
characteristics particularly valuable; their design choices
will be influenced by a particular conception of the good
life, and this is obviously illiberal.
To render the issue a bit more vivid, consider the fol-
lowing case. A couple might delight in Castrato Opera and
deem it the highest form of human expression. Castrato
Opera is an Italian Renaissance form of opera sung by men
without testicles, allowing them to hit the high notes. This
couple designs a son who is born without testicles.2 They
hope that, by designing him in this fashion, he will choose
a life dedicated to this art and live what they deem the good
life. Both Liberal Eugenics and the Theory of Enhance-
ment would allow this. For reproductive capacity is not a
1 In formulating the Theory of Enhancement, Fox does hold that
perfectionist enhancement is limited by harm to the offspring, others
or an important public good (2007, p. 14). However, he argues that
restriction for the sake of protecting public goods will be limited in
practice. As to the ‘harm to offspring or others clause’, he does not
elaborate how they should be interpreted. Judging from the context it
seems that harm to offspring should be taken in a bodily sense. In this
way it is parallel to the requirement of safety in his formulation of the
requirement of natural primary goods enhancement. The fact that
perfectionist enhancement violates your autonomy does not constitute
harm. If he wishes to include this under harm, it results in a radically
different theory. This should have been explicitly noted. However,
judging from the objections Fox considers against the Theory of
Enhancement and how he seeks to rebut them (2007, pp. 20–23) this
is not the intended meaning.
2 It is impossible to offer the child the option of having his testicles
removed later in life, as by that time, his voice will have broken.
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natural primary good; it is not useful for all plans of life. Ex
hypothesi, it is a handicap for those who wish to become
Castrato singers.3
As it happens, their son decides, after reviewing many
potential plans of life available in society, that he wishes to
pursue the life of a playboy. For this plan of life his par-
ents’ design has left him ill-suited. It has limited his life
plan and diminished his autonomy, by robbing him of his
most preferred option. What is more, this fact is not a
matter of bad luck, beyond anyone’s control, but rather a
matter of conscious design. Had this not been the case, he
could not have blamed his parents for his condition. But in
this case, his most preferred option would have still been
available had his parents not designed him as they did. We
can imagine the child, miserable because his parents have
denied him his preferred way of life, asking them why they
designed him as they did.4 Their response will be that they
wanted him to sing Castrato, because they deemed it a
particularly valuable way of life they wished for their son.5
This example may seem exotic, but it is symptomatic of
a large range of cases. There are many characteristics that
are advantageous to have in certain fields but disadvanta-
geous to have in others. The complex constellations of
traits and characteristics that individuals possess make
them more suited for some plans of life than others. If one
is physically strong but has limited fine motor skills, is a
natural leader and does well in hierarchical organisations,
one is well suited for a career in the military, but perhaps
less suited for life in an artistic commune. If one is nimble
and elegant in movement one is suited for the ballet, but ill-
suited for playing ice-hockey. Those who have an incli-
nation for thinking analytically might make great
philosophers, but bad poets, and having a steady palm
makes one a good surgeon, but a bad expressionist painter.
When parents design their children to have certain
perfectionist natural goods, they are actively making some
plans of life more accessible and attractive than others.
Such intervention requires justification. It cannot be that
they intervene for no reason, and hence it is legitimate to
ask why parents decided to give their children certain
perfectionist natural goods that are useful for realising
some conceptions of the good but not others. Ultimately,
the only thing that can justify choosing one set of charac-
teristics over another is the value judgment that these
characteristics and the plans of life they give access to are
superior in some sense to other characteristics and plans of
life. There is an infinite range of perfectionist natural goods
parents might give their children, and in order to choose
which ones they wish to endow their children with, parent
must rely on particular values. Without such values to act
as a yardstick, there can be no reason to select a particular
set of perfectionist natural goods over another set. Hence
parents giving their children perfectionist natural goods
that are useful for realising certain conceptions of the good
constitutes an endorsement of those conceptions of the
good. When we ask what the justification of using eugenics
in this way is, the answer will always be based on some
parental conception of the good.
No liberal can think that this is a good and valid reason
for such action, and that children whose parents design
them to be suited for certain particular plans of life have no
complaint against them. Parents who avail themselves of
eugenics are exercising power over the next generation.
Liberalism requires that this be done in a neutral fashion.
But I have argued that endowing individuals with goods
that are useful for only some conceptions of the good
cannot be justified in a neutral fashion. Hence allowing
perfectionist eugenics is a blatant violation of the neutrality
requirement that is so integral to liberalism that was dis-
cussed in my treatment of the doctrine above. For that
reason liberals cannot allow parents to use the tools of
genetics to design their children as they please. Yet this is
exactly what both Liberal Eugenics and the Theory of
Enhancement would have us permit. I conclude that both
Liberal Eugenics and the Theory of Enhancement violate
the core principles of liberalism in leaving perfectionist
enhancement to parental discretion; any such enhancement
is inherently based on a conception of the good and in
violation of the liberal insistence on neutrality.
Another way of seeing this is by reflecting on the role of
paternalism in Fox’s argument. Fox holds that compulsory
natural primary goods enhancement is justified by the
allowance liberals make for paternalist action. And it is
true that liberals do allow paternalist action under certain
conditions. Fox follows Dan Brock (1988) in holding that:
Paternalism is justified if and only if two conditions
hold: first, the individual for whom the good is intended
is not at the relevant time capable of free choice; and
second, it can be reasonably expected, on the basis of
evidence about the individual’s particular motivations
3 A wider theory of natural primary goods, which holds that they
include traits that are useful for most rather than all plans of life is
unavailable. For this raises the question which plans of life are
excluded and why. Why is the life of a Castrato not worthy of
inclusion in the determination of what counts as a natural primary
good? The only answer that may be given is that this life is somehow
not as good as others, which is precisely the sort of violation of
neutrality liberalism avoids.
4 Here I borrow a narrative device from Ackerman (1980, pp. 3–5).
5 Perhaps they will be determined to be more thorough next time, by
seeking genetic tools that ensure that their next child will have the
desire to be a Castrato singer written into his DNA. It is unclear to me
if Liberal Eugenics or the Theory of Enhancement would allow this
total eradication of autonomy, but this is perhaps the ultimate
violation of liberalism, making children machines to do their parents’
bidding. No theory that allows this can haven even the slightest claim
to being liberal.
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and objectives, that she would upon regaining auton-
omy be grateful for the state6 having under the
circumstances so acted on her behalf (Fox 2007, p. 8).
Compulsory natural primary goods enhancement, which
is in effect others making genetic choices for children, is
allowed under this rule. First of all, by virtue of the nature
of genetic enhancement, children cannot choose their genes
freely when they are conceived. Hence the first condition is
satisfied. Secondly, we can assume that individuals will be
grateful for genetic enhancements that are useful for any
and all plans of life. In this way, natural primary goods
enhancement meets the paternalism test, and qualifies as a
liberal policy.
But perfectionist enhancement fares quite differently.
While it does, like all intergenerational eugenics, meet the
first test, it obviously fails the second test. It cannot be
assumed that the children would eventually be grateful for
perfectionist enhancement that is practiced on them in the
name of paternalism. It seems obvious that, given liberal-
ism’s insistence that individuals choose their own plan of
life, perfectionist enhancement cannot be justified by
hypothetical consent. For this reason perfectionist pater-
nalism cannot be allowed by Fox’s own test, and the
Theory of Enhancement’s allowance for perfectionist
enhancement is denied.
Objections
Fox seems aware of objections to perfectionist eugenics
similar in spirit to this one, and makes attempts to dismiss
them. However, his rejoinders are ineffective. For example,
he considers Habermas’ objection against Liberal Eugenics
that being the product of genetic design undermines the
conditions required for the human experience of freedom
(2003). Habermas notes that children who are designed by
their parents will not feel the authors of their own lives, but
rather feel compelled towards a particular plan of life they
cannot reject or revise (2003, p. 62). This objection is
similar in some respects to my objection from autonomy
although it is consequentialist in nature. It rides on the
assumption that designed children will experience these
undesirable consequences. One might doubt this. However,
my objection relies on the liberal prohibition on individuals
exercising power over others in a non-neutral fashion. Even
if designed children would still feel free, this charge stands
because of its deontological nature.
Fox replies to Habermas that the Theory of Enhance-
ment does not suffer from this problem (2007, pp. 18–19).
This is because it is the state that administers the natural
primary enhancement in his theory. How this reply is
available, given the fact that Fox notes (2007, p. 15) that
mandatory enhancement is a matter of prima facie moral
obligation and not state action, is unclear. But even if it
were available, I fail to see how the fact that the state has
designed me will make me feel more capable of rejecting
that design than if I had been designed by my parents. As I
will argue below, who is designing me is neither here nor
there, as far as the liberal response to eugenics is con-
cerned. A further problem with Fox’s reply is that the
Theory of Enhancement still allows parents to design their
children with perfectionist natural goods. And this is fun-
damentally the root of the objection. Perfectionist
enhancement, which is only useful for certain plans of life,
is a far bigger threat to the conditions of human freedom
than natural primary goods enhancement. This is because
the former type of enhancement is used to make certain
life-plans more attractive and easier to achieve. Knowing
that I was designed for any plan of life may simply be
empowering, but knowing that I was designed for one
particular life undermines my experience of liberty in the
way Habermas suggests. Both Liberal Eugenics and the
Theory of Enhancement are susceptible to that charge.
However, the Theory of Neutral Enhancement does not
suffer from this problem, as it forbids the type of perfec-
tionist enhancement that is most threatening to the
conditions for the experience of human freedom.
Something similar goes for Fox’s arguments against
Davis (2001, p. 33) and O’Donovan (1984, pp. 1–2), who
argue that Liberal Eugenics gives parents too much domi-
nation over their children and how they turn out. Again this
concern implicitly rides on protecting the autonomy of the
child. Fox’s paper argues that the Theory of Enhancement
evades this charge because it at least restricts parental dis-
cretion over questions of natural primary enhancement
(2007, pp. 19–20). But this is hardly comforting. Parents still
have the right of perfectionist enhancement. It is through this
type of enhancement that they exercise the greatest power
over how their children turn out. This type of enhancement
represents a far bigger threat of parental domination than
natural primary goods enhancement, which does not steer
children towards any particular plan of life. Again, the
Theory of Neutral Enhancement forbids this type of
enhancement and is hence able to evade these charges, while
the Theory of Enhancement is not.
Perhaps Feinberg comes closest to articulating the liberal
concern for the protection of the autonomy of the child (Fox
2007, pp. 20–21). Feinberg (1980) argues that a child has a
right to an open future. In my view the problem is not so
much the mere prejudicing of the child’s future as such—
which could also come about by bad luck—but rather the
imposition of a theory of the good on the child. Nevertheless,
our objections are quite similar. Fox’s reply is twofold. The
6 I assume this test does not only apply for state-inflicted paternalism,
but for paternalism as such, regardless of who is practicing it.
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first reply holds, following Taylor (1985, pp. 190–191), that
individuals cannot exercise autonomy outside of a social
environment, such as the family. They cannot make sense of
their options if they are not given a set of values to guide their
choice. Parents may restrict the autonomy of their children,
so as to allow them to better exercise it. This is said to license
perfectionist enhancement.
It cannot be denied that parents have discretion over how
to raise their children. However, liberals do not see this
discretion as an exception to the prohibition on imposing a
theory of the good on others. Rather, this discretion is
grounded in the recognition that children need to develop
their capacity for autonomy, and that this is best achieved in a
stable environment (cf. Ackerman 1980, pp. 139–168), as
Taylor suggests. Parents may limit their children’s autonomy
in this context, so as to allow them to develop into competent
liberal citizens. As this is achieved, the restrictions must be
lifted. Hence the parental discretion Liberal Eugenics and the
Theory of Enhancement rely on for their appeal is heavily
regulated. It hardly justifies an unrestricted right to perfec-
tionist enhancement or indoctrination, but something much
more limited. Indeed perfectionist enhancement would be
particularly limited in this understanding of restricting
autonomy for the sake of autonomy, as liberals only hold this
permissible while children are not yet competent adults. As
they develop their own conceptions of the good, the
restrictions of autonomy must be lifted. But genetic inter-
vention cannot be removed; it is a permanent restriction of
autonomy that no liberal can countenance. Hence the Theory
of Neutral Enhancement, which forbids such genetic inter-
vention, is the correct liberal attitude to this problem.
The second reply holds that the good of an intimate
family life cannot be realised without respecting parental
privacy. Any regulation concerning how the tools of per-
fectionist enhancement should be used constitutes an
invasion of that privacy. But this would only be a reason to
discard the child’s right to an open future if the good of an
intimate family life is deemed more important than the
rights of the child. This may be a good argument, but it is
not a liberal argument. However appealing, an intimate
family life represents a particular conception of the good,
and liberals cannot allow that contestable conception of the
good to justify incursion on individuals’ rights. And as the
liberal answer to the problem of eugenics is at issue, rather
than the correct one, this renders the rebuttal moot.
By virtue of its intergenerational nature, genetic inter-
vention requires the present generation to exercise power
over the next. This exercise of power must, one day, be
justified to the next generation. Liberals cannot believe that
answers based on the theory of the good those who wield
that power espouse justify perfectionist eugenics. For that
reason liberals cannot allow parents, or anyone else for that
matter, to use the tools of genetics to distribute
perfectionist natural goods as they please. Liberal Eugenics
and the Theory of Enhancement are said to be an
improvement over state-mandated eugenics because they
take the power of genetics away from the state and put it in
the hands of parents (Fox 2007, pp. 3–4). They are state-
neutral. But this makes no difference for liberals, as they do
not care merely about state neutrality, but about neutrality
as such. In both theories of eugenics an external entity is
allowed to wield power over the next generation, and that
power must be justified in the same way, regardless of who
is doing the genetic intervention. Where it concerns ques-
tions of eugenics, the relationship between children and the
government is fundamentally no different from the rela-
tionship between children and their parents.
The theory of neutral enhancement
In conclusion, the shocking illiberality of Liberal Eugenics
scarcely lies in the fact that it allows parents to deny their
children a good start in life—that is simply old-fashioned
neglect. Rather, the central illiberality of Liberal Eugenics
lies in the fact that it allows parents to design their children
according to their own conception of what a good life is.
The Theory of Enhancement fares no better in this respect,
and can hardly to be said to represent a significantly more
liberal attitude towards the question of eugenics than Lib-
eral Eugenics.
Based on what I have argued above, it is now clear what
would be the appropriate liberal attitude to genetic
enhancement of the sort discussed. It seems that liberals
cannot allow others, be it the state or the parents, to choose
the genetics traits of children. The liberal respect for
autonomy and the associated commitment to protecting
individuals from other people’s conceptions of the good,
forbid anyone picking other people’s genes. This is the
general liberal rule. Having said that, there are exceptions
that liberals would be willing to countenance. Genetic traits
that are useful for all plans of life may be promoted without
imposing any theory of the good. Indeed, given liberals’
mildly perfectionist desire to promote autonomy, liberals
should consider this type of enhancement morally required.
This attitude is captured the Theory of Neutral
Enhancement.7
7 It is broadly similar to Bruce Ackerman’s treatment of this issue in
(1980, pp. 107–138). This excellent treatment of the issue has not had
the prominence it deserves, and I hope that this article will revive
interest in it. It differs from this theory in that it allows compulsory
natural primary goods enhancement, while Ackerman only allows
genetic intervention to prevent individuals to be genetically domi-
nated by others. However, I take Fox’s arguments to show that
liberalism committed to promoting human autonomy can go further
than the weaker criterion of genetic non-domination.
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The conclusion that liberals cannot allow the unfettered
use of eugenics is also significant for the larger debate about
eugenics. Those who have been critical of eugenics have
claimed that the liberal perspective on this matter runs foul
of certain deeply held intuitions (e.g. Fox 2007, p. 24;
Sandel 2007, Chapter 1). This has been based on the
assumption that liberalism requires a permissive attitude
towards eugenics. In particular, it has been noted that the
theory might result in a world in which eugenic practices are
widespread, which threatens many important goods, such
social solidarity or parental love. Because of this many will
have held that liberalism is a morally impoverished
framework for dealing with these matters (e.g. Fox 2007, p.
25). This is said to render liberalism an ‘‘impoverished
framework’’ for considering the question of eugenics.
However, I am not convinced that the Theory of Neutral
Enhancement, which I have argued to be the correct liberal
position on these matters, is quite as intuitively unattractive.
Note that the Theory of Neutral Enhancement allows less
enhancement to take place than the Theory of Enhance-
ment, as the former restricts the perfectionist eugenics the
latter would allow. It is better equipped to deal with the
intuition that extensive eugenics in society would be
undesirable. Furthermore, given the fact that the enhance-
ment that is allowed by the Theory of Neutral Enhancement
is universally required, it is unlikely that this would
undermine social solidarity or parental love. The liberal
response to the question of eugenics, especially when
elaborated into the Theory of Neutral Enhancement, might
be the shining star that guides us in these uncharted waters
after all.
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